There are a number of assumptions that the agreement makes that are problematic. On the one hand, the Afghan government was not part of the negotiations or signed the final agreement. Although U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khaililzad tried to keep Afghan President Ashraf Ghani informed and kept on board, the Afghan government was increasingly concerned and upset that they had been excluded from discussions about his own country`s future. The fact that the Afghan government or its representatives were not allowed to participate in the negotiations was due to the insistence of the Taliban, who said that the current government in Afghanistan was not a legitimate government, but a puppet of the United States. Whether this is true or not can be debated, but the Taliban have imposed themselves on this issue. On February 29, 2020, the United States and the Afghan Taliban signed a peace agreement in Doha, Qatar, to end the long war in Afghanistan. The agreement contains much of the same terms that were agreed in September 2019, but were cut by President Trump. Essentially, this agreement requires the withdrawal of U.S. forces and the Afghan coalition in exchange for a promise that the Taliban would not allow terrorist groups to operate on Afghan soil. However, the agreement is based on several assumptions that will make its success problematic. This agreement requires an Afghan government operating in Kabul, with which it will be possible to negotiate. The recent Afghan presidential elections have not upset those responsible, but the waters.
The failure of the presidential election took place last September, but the vote counting process was so confusing and controversial that the winner was not announced until 18 February 2020, almost five months after the election. The erroneous and controversial elections led to a controversial and divided government in Kabul, which led to a deadlock over those responsible and made it difficult to implement the next stage of the peace agreement. As a result, the Taliban, with a weak or divided government in Kabul, will be in a stronger position to dictate the terms of an agreement on the future of Afghanistan that would be favourable to their position. After nine roundtable discussions, negotiators signed a peace agreement in February 2020 that addresses four key themes: the formal agreement between the United States and the Taliban contains a series of talks that would continue into the future between the United States, the Taliban and the Afghan government. Yet ongoing violence, particularly against innocent civilian communities, largely denies the value of these discussions. Right now, the Taliban are attacking the Afghan government when they are not attacking the United States and our allies. Why would the United States commit to an agreement in which the Taliban could conclude that the United States and its coalition partners would be immune to attacks, but would the United States be cautious that the Taliban would attack our main ally in this war, the Afghan government? On his face, it would be difficult for the Afghan government to find a logical good reason to meet in the midst of the ongoing attacks. These Taliban activities are the true definition of bad faith and with the United States.